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GREGORY MORRIS MATISON, aka
GERALD MORRIS, aka MORRIS
GREGORY MATISON,
Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final order of the Sixth Judicial
District

in and for Sevier County, State of Utah, entered on

January 28, 1993. Notice of Appeal was filed on February 22, 1993.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Article
I, Section XII of the Utah Constitution, Section 77-1-6(g) and
Section 77-35-26 of the Utah Code, and Rule 3, Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals, since the appeal arises from conviction in a
criminal case of a degree less than a capital offense.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal of right to the Utah Court of Appeals from
a final judgment of the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for
Sevier County, State of Utah, wherein Appellant was convicted of
Possession

of

a Controlled

Substance, a third

degree

felony.

Appellant was sentenced to a term of zero to five years and fined
$5,000.00

plus

85%

surcharge.

The execution

of the prison

sentence was stayed and all but $1,250.00 plus 85% surcharge of the
fine was suspended.

However, the Appellant was required to serve

one year in the Sevier County Jail with a review in ninety days
from the date the jail sentence begins. A stay pending appeal was
granted.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
The following issues are presented for review:
1. Was the search of Appellant's vehicle done in violation of
his rights as guaranteed by Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution?
A.

Does Appellant herein have standing to challenge the

search of the automobile and luggage therein?
B.

Was

there

insufficient

evidence

to

establish

an

articulable suspicion to detain Appellant beyond the scope of a
traffic stop?
C.

Did the Appellant voluntarily consent to the search of the

vehicle he was driving?
D.

Does the Utah Constitution require both a knowing and

voluntary waiver of Article I, Section 14 rights before evidence
seized pursuant to a consent search is admissible?
E.

Did

the

consent

given

to

search

the

vehicle

lack

attenuation from the initial illegal stop, making the evidence
seized inadmissible?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

The

issue

of

standing

is

to

be

reviewed

under

a

correctness standard offering no deference to the trial court.

2

State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913 (Utah App. 1992).
2.

The issue of whether the Utah Constitution requires a

knowing and voluntary waiver before evidence seized pursuant to a
consent search is admissible is a question of law.

The court

reviews such questions for correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d
126 (Utah 1993) .
3.

All other issues are to be reviewed for correctness with

deference to the trial court's determination unless they are found
to be clearly erroneous.

State v. Thurman, supra.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah:
The rights of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated an no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant was charged by Information with the offense of
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a
violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-8 (1953 as amended).
(R. 1.)

A preliminary hearing was held on April 21, 1992, and the
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Appellant was bound over for trial.

(R. 19, Tr. 95-119.)

trial Appellant made a motion to suppress the evidence.

Prior to

He alleged

that the evidence was seized in violation of Article I, Section 14
of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
evidentiary hearing.

(R. 22, 23.) That motion was denied after an
(R. 24, 34-38, Tr. 120-162.)

On December 8, 1992, Appellant waived his right to trial by
jury and this case was tried to the court on stipulated facts and
a stipulation that the court received into evidence, the video tape
made by Deputy Barney at the time of the stop, together with all
the testimony from the Motion to Suppress hearing.

(R. 81, Tr.

164-177.)
Appellant was convicted as charged in the Information.
81.)

(R.

The court at sentencing reduced the charge to a third degree

felony and sentenced the Appellant to 0-5 years and $5,000.00. The
court stayed execution of the sentence and ordered Appellant to
serve one year in the county jail and pay a fine of $1,250.00, plus
an 85% surcharge.

The court granted a stay of execution of the

sentence pending appeal.

(R. 83, 85-86, Tr. 4.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 14, 1992, as he was leaving Salina Deputy Phil
Barney observed a vehicle coming off eastbound 1-70. Deputy Barney
observed the vehicle fish tail but could not determine if it ran
the stop sign since he could not see the stop sign.

Deputy Barney

observed the vehicle proceed past him to the Scenic Quik Stop in
Salina.

(Tr. 100-101, 125-127.)

Deputy Barney proceeded out onto

4

1-70 eastbound where he stopped his vehicle and watched.

Shortly

thereafterf (10-15 minutes), the vehicle Deputy Barney had observed
proceeded past him eastbound on 1-70.
128.)

(Tr. 98, 99, 101-102, 127-

Deputy Barney did not observe the vehicle doing anything

illegal at this time but he decided to stop the vehicle to talk to
the driver about the fishtailing incident in Salina some ten to
fifteen minutes earlier.
Deputy

Barney

testified

(Tr. 129.)

Upon stopping the vehicle,

that the Appellant

told him that

the

vehicle belonged to a friend and had been loaned to him to drive to
Minnesota.

(Tr. 104.)

The Appellant was advised by Deputy Barney as to why he was
stopped.

(Tr. 133.)

Upon stopping the vehicle, Deputy Barney

claims he detected the smell of fresh coffee, (Tr. 106, 132),
whereupon he asked the Appellant, Gregory Matison, if he could
"look" inside the car.

(Ex. 1, Tr. 105, 134.)

The Appellant

agreed, whereupon Deputy Barney looked inside the car and found
nothing.

(Ex. 1, Tr. 106.)

The Appellant was ordered outside the

vehicle while Deputy Barney looked.

(Ex. 1.)

Upon completion of

the look inside the car, Deputy Barney ordered Appellant Matison to
pop the trunk.

(Ex. 1, Tr. 106.)

Deputy Barney opened suitcases

found inside the trunk and located and seized 138.25 pounds of
marijuana.
bags.

Deputy Barney did not ask permission to look in the

(Ex. 1, Tr. 135, 138.)

When asked if the suitcase was his,

Appellant Matison said no it belonged to a friend and he was taking
it to Minnesota for him.

(Ex. 1, Tr. 107.)
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ISSUE
WAS THE SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE DONE IN
VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS AS GUARANTEED BY
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Appellant herein has standing to challenge the warrantless
search of a vehicle entrusted to him.
The stop of Appellant in Sevier County was unlawful and the
subsequent search of the vehicle violated his right to be free from
warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as described in
Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
There was insufficient evidence to establish an articulable
suspicion to detain Appellant beyond the scope of the traffic stop
and there was insufficient attenuation from the initial illegal
stop to render the evidence admissible.

The Appellant did not

knowing and intentionally waive his Utah Constitutional rights nor
did he consent to the search of the vehicle he was driving.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT HEREIN HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE
THE SEARCH OF THE AUTOMOBILE AND LUGGAGE THEREIN
In order to challenge the validity of a search and seizure, an
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that his or her own
Fourth Amendment rights have been violated.

See, e.g., Rakas v.

Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n.l, 133-34 (1978); United States v.
Abreau, 935 F.2d 1130, 1132 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S.Ct. 271
(1991).

The issue whether a search violated an appellant's Fourth

Amendment rights involves two inquiries.
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First, an appellant must

establish that he or she had a subjective expectation of privacy in
the place or property searched.

E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.

735, 740 (1979); Abreau, 935 F.2d at 1132.

Second, an appellant

must establish that society would recognize his or her subjective
expectation as objectively reasonable.

E.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at

740; Abreau, 935 F.2d at 1132.
Appellant Matison asserts that he has a protected interest in
the luggage searched herein by virtue of his stature as bailee.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that bailees have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in luggage in their possession
and

therefore, have

luggage.

standing

to challenge the

search of

such

United States v. Benitez-Arrequin, 973 F.2d 823 (10th

Cir. 1992).

(Rehearing denied.)

See also State v. Aranqo, 912

F.2d 441, 445 (10th Cir. 1990) cert denied; 111 S.Ct. 1318 (1991);
See also Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 19787) cert
denied 487 U.S. 1218 (1988); State v. Grundy, 607 P.2d 1235 1237-38
(Wash Ct. App. 1980) .
In U.S. v. Benitez-Arrequin, supra, the Court of Appeals had
before it an issue as to whether the defendant had standing to
challenge the search of luggage in his possession.

The defendant

therein was stopped at the Amtrak Station in Salt Lake City, Utah
while carrying two bags. Two state narcotics agents confronted the
defendant who spoke no English.

One of the agents testified that

he made hand motions indicating he wanted the defendant to open the
bags; that the defendant bent down and opened the bags and handed
it to the agent.

The agent found an object inside which he
7

suspected to be narcotics; that a drug sniffing dog alerted on it,
whereupon he opened it and found 350 grams of heroin*

At the

suppression hearing the defendant testified that one of the bags
was his and the other belonged to a friend who had given it to him
to take to Salt Lake City.
On ruling that the defendant had standing for a motion to
suppress items found in this bag, the Tenth Circuit said:
We are persuaded further that defendant's
subjective expectation of privacy is one which
society
would
recognize
as
objectively
reasonable.
In general, luggage such as
suitcases
and
footlockers
is
"a common
repository for one's personal effects, and
therefore is inevitably associated with the
expectation of privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 762 & n.9 (1979).
In other
contexts, we have held that lawful possession
carries with it the legitimate expectation of
privacy. See, e.g., United States v. RubioRivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 1990)
(holding in automobile search case that
"[w]here the defendant offers sufficient
evidence indicating that he has permission of
the owner to use the vehicle, the defendant
plainly has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the vehicle and standing to
challenge the search of the vehicle").
We
agree with the courts that have concluded that
a person transporting luggage as a bailee, or
at least with the permission of the owner, has
a reasonable expectation of privacy that
society would recognize.
See Robles, 510
N.E.2d at 663; Casey, 296 S.E.2d at 482;
Grundy, 607 P.2d at 1237-38. Further, we feel
that society's recognition of defendant's
expectation of privacy is indicated by "the
general rule that a bailee in possession of
personal property may recover compensation for
any conversion of the article bailed or
destruction of or damage to the bailed
property, by another while in his possession."
8 Am. Jur. 2d Bailments Section 263 (1980).
* * * * *
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We
are convinced
the defendant
had
a
sufficient interest as a bailee to challenge
the search. Indeed, in Rakas, the Court noted
that M[o]ne of the main rights attaching to
property is the right to exclude others, see
W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 2, ch. 1,
and one who owns or lawfully possesses or
controls property will in all likelihood have
a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue
of this right to exclude." Rakas, 439 U.S. at
143-44 n.12. (Emphasis added.)
At 828-829.
In denying a petition for rehearing on the issue of standing,
the Tenth Circuit said:
We remain convinced that the factual situation
here shows an expectation of privacy that
society would recognize as reasonable. This
conclusion comfortably fits within the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Rakas that distinctions
in property and tort law between guests,
licensees, and the like, ought not control.
We
have
instead
considered
all
the
circumstances, as noted above and in our
opinion, and we are satisfied that the
defendant at the time of the seizure did have
a legitimate expectation of privacy as one in
charge of the bag, and that it was one which
society
would
recognize
as
objectively
reasonable. The bag was "a common repository
for one's personal effects and therefore [was]
inevitably associated with the expectation of
privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
762 & n.9 (1979).
Federal and state cases
decided under the Fourth Amendment have held
that such an expectation of privacy is one
that society would recognize.
See United
States v. Reeves, No. CR-92-124-JLQ, 1992 WL
162377, at *7-8 (E.D. Wash. July 9, 1992)
(holding bailee had expectation of privacy in
briefcase which was objectively reasonable);
Robles v. State 510 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind.
1987)
(holding
bailee
had
standing
to
challenge search of luggage), cert denied, 478
U.S. 1218 (1988); State v. Casey 296 S.E.2d
473, 482 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding bailee
had standing to challenge search of luggage);
State v. Grundy, 607 P.2d 1235, 1237-38 (Wash
Ct. App. 1980) (holding bailees had standing
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to challenge search of stolen footlocker).
See generally United States v. Oswald, 783
F.2d 663, 666 (6th Cir, 1986) (explaining that
" [a] suitcase or briefcase is property of a
kind in which the owner or bailee normally has
a strong expectation of privacy . . • but . .
. such an expectation can be given up"). 2
The reasonableness of such an expectation of
privacy is supported by the bailee's right of
exclusion. "One of the main rights attaching
to property is the right to exclude others,
see W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 2, ch.
1, and one who owns or lawfully possesses or
controls property will in all likelihood have
a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue
of this right to exclude." Rakas, 439 U.S. at
144 n.12 (emphasis added).
A bailment may
give "the bailee the sole custody and control
of the article bailed, or the right to
exclusive possession of the property, even
against the bailor."
8 C.J.S. Bailments
Section 29, at 254-55
(1988)
(footnotes
omitted).
This general rule is followed in
both states, California and Utah, which had a
relationship to the bailment here.
See
McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 304 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992); Porter v. Los Angeles Turf
Club, Inc., 105 P.2d 956 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. C t . ) .
The defendant's acts here
respecting the bag were consistent with the
bailee usually having a legal duty to care for
the property. 8 C.J.S. Bailments Section 46,
at 276-77; see, e.g., Staheli v. Farmers'
Coop, of S. Utah, 655 P.2d 680, 682 (Utah
1982); Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co.
Emmel, 533 P.2d 900, 901 (Utah 1975); Baugh v.
Rogers, 148 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1944). 3
2

0f course, "a warrantless search could not be characterized
as reasonable simply because, after the official invasion of
privacy occurred, contraband is discovered."
United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 & n.9 (1984) (citing cases).
3

0n this point, the government relies upon the holding in
United States v. Monie, 907 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1990), that a man
hired to drive a car across country did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in two suitcases in the trunk.
We find
Monie clearly distinguishable.
The defendant there denied
ownership of the locked suitcases of another in a car trunk,
disclaimed any interest in their contents, and told the troopers he

10

At 830-832.
This Court has adopted the reasoning of the court in Rakas in
deciding standing issues.

See State v. Atwood 831 P.2d 1056 (Utah

App. 1992); State v. Sepulveda, supra; State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d
561 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App.)
cert denied 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
The

court

in

Sepulveda

outlines

a

two

step

test

for

determining whether a defendant has shown the requisite expectation
of privacy in the area searched to establish standing.
First the appellant must demonstrate a subjective expectation
of privacy in the object of the challenged search and second, the
court must conclude as a matter of law whether society is willing
to recognize the individual's expectation of privacy as legitimate.
State v. Sepulveda, supra at 915.
The Utah courts have concluded that an appellant must have at
least a possessory control of the car to contest a warrantless
automobile search. See State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-127
(Utah 1987); State v. Robinson, supra, 437 N. 6.
In Constantino the Supreme Court found no standing existed
because there was no evidence that the defendant had driven the car
with the owner's permission and therefore, the defendant could not
assert an expectation of privacy.

Id. 126-27.

did not have keys to them. On these facts, the court held that the
first factual test of a subjective expectation of privacy was not
met. The court did not reach the second issue, which is the only
and controlling question here — whether the privacy expectation
was one that society would recognize as reasonable. See Id. at
794.
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In Robinson there was evidence that the defendants were given
permission by the owner of the vehicle to take it on vacation and
the court held that such evidence established a possessory interest
sufficient to give them a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
interior of the vehicle.
In

Sepulveda

there

Id. at 437 N.6.
was

evidence

that

the

defendant

had

permission from the owner of the vehicle to drive it to Utah.

The

court found that the evidence established:
1.

Defendant was driving the car;

2.

Defendant had permission to use the car; and

3.

Defendant had personal belongings in the car.

Id. p. 916.

The court then found that the fact that the defendant was driving
the car with the owner's permission was sufficient to confer a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the car interior to permit him
to challenge a warrantless search of the car.

Id. 916-917.

Deputy Barney testified that the Appellant told him a friend
had loaned him the vehicle and he was driving it to Minnesota.
(Tr. 104.)

The video tape, (Exhibit 1 ) , made by Deputy Barney of

Appellant's arrest that was received in evidence, the Appellant
herein clearly states that the automobile wherein the marijuana was
found was entrusted to him for delivery to another just as was the
case in U.S. v. Arrequin, supra. State v. Sepulveda/ supra; and
State v. Robinson, supra.
the

The reasoning of those cases applies to

facts of this case and should result
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in a decision

that

Appellant Matison has standing to challenge the search of the
vehicle and luggage herein.
POINT II
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
AN ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO DETAIN APPELLANT
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A TRAFFIC STOP
The Appellant herein was not stopped for any traffic violation
committed at the time of the stop.

Deputy Barney testified that

the vehicle had done nothing in violation of the law just prior to
his stopping it. He testified the reason he stopped it was to talk
to the driver about the incident of fishtailing that had been
observed earlier, (10-15 minutes), in Salina.
Under Utah

law an officer cannot

legally make an arrest

without a warrant for "good cause" in misdemeanor cases unless the
offense was committed in his presence and the arrest was made
immediately or within a reasonable time thereafter.

Oleson v.

Pincock, 251 P. 23 (1926).
For the sake of argument let us assume a valid traffic stop
had been made.

In State v. Robinson. 191

P.2d 431 (Utah App.

1990), this Court discussed the Fourth Amendment parameters for
police officers making such stops. The court stated:
An officer conducting a routine traffic stop
may request a driver's license and vehicle
registration, conduct a computer check, and
issue a citation.
United States v. Guzman,
864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988). However,
once the driver has produced a valid license
and evidence of entitlement to use the
vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on his
way, without being subject to further delay by
police for additional questioning." Jd. Any
further temporary detention for investigative
questioning after the fulfillment of the
13

purpose for the initial traffic stop is
justified under the Fourth Amendment only if
the detaining
officer has a
reasonable
suspicion of serious criminal activity. Id.;
United States v. Walker [751 F.Supp. 199 (D.
Ut. 1990)].
The detaining officers must be
able to articulate a particularized and
objective basis for their suspicions that is
drawn from the totality of circumstances
facing them at the time of the seizure.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18
183 (1987).
797 P.2d at 435.
Appellant herein was questioned about where he had been, where
he was going, and whether he was in possession of any firearms or
narcotics.

The

deputy

maintained

possession

of

the

certain

documents relating to the sale of the vehicle Appellant was driving
and

Appellant's

driver's
was

license

free

to

the

leave

encounter.

Furthermore,

Appellant

questioning.

This questioning took the encounter beyond the scope

of a simple traffic stop.

not

throughout

during

this

It became a detention which raised

additional Fourth Amendment interests.

State v. Robinson, supra.

Such

it was

a detention

is

lawful, only

articulable or reasonable suspicion.

if

justified

by

an

Id.

The concept of a reasonable or articulable suspicion was first
addressed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

In that case, the

Court noted that reasonable suspicion must be more than an inchoate
and imparticularized

suspicion or hunch.

In United States v.

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989), the Court further
stated:
The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal
level of objective justification" for making
the stop.
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 218
14

(1984).
That
level
of
suspicion
is
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by
a preponderance of the evidence. We have held
that probable cause means "a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found," Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983), and the level of suspicion required
for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding
than that for probable cause.
See United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,
541, 544 (1985).
The concept of reasonable suspicion, like
probable cause, is not "readily or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules." Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232.
The Court in Sokolow also noted the totality of the circumstances
must

be

considered

in

determining

if

the

articulable

facts

supported a reasonable suspicion.
There are no articulable suspicions to justify the temporary
detention.

Three cases from this jurisdiction have specifically

held that demeanor is an insufficient basis upon which to detain an
individual.

State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987); State v.

Robinson, supra, and State v. Godina-Luna, 862 P.2d 652, (Utah App.
1992).
In

State

v.

Mendoza,

supra,

defendant's vehicle on Interstate 15.
not produce

INS

officers

the

When the defendants could

identification, the car was searched

quantity of marijuana was found.

stopped

and a large

The court held that the officers

lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.

One of the

factors listed by the State was that the defendants appeared to be
nervous.

The agents indicated that the defendants had a "white

knuckled", rigid look and failed to make eye contact.

The court

held that the failure to make eye contact carried no weight in
15

determining if a crime was being committed.
In

Robinson,

violation.

the

defendants

were

stopped

for

a

traffic

The trooper who made that stop questioned them about

possessing guns, drugs or currency.

This was done as the trooper

held the defendants' identification and vehicle registration.

The

defendants allowed the trooper to search the back of the van they
were driving, but would not allow the trooper to search under a
bed.

Eventually, a sniffer dog searched the van and a large

quantity of marijuana was discovered.

The trooper justified the

detention because he believed that the defendants did not have
enough gear to be comfortable on the camping trip on which they
claimed to be going.

He also felt that both defendants appeared to

be nervous. One occupant refused to make eye contact and the other
appeared

to be talkative

and

evasive.

The court

noted

that

avoidance of eye contact is consistent with innocent as well as
criminal behavior.

Citing State v. Mendoza, supra, the court held

that Utah appellate courts have afforded no weight to nervous
conduct in determining if an officer had reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.

The reason for that holding is that there is

too much subjectivity in assessing nervousness as a factor to
establish a reasonable suspicion.
Recently, in State v. Godina-Luna, supra, this Court upheld
the

District

suppress.

Court's

granting

of

the

defendant's

motion

to

The trial court concluded that the defendant had been

unlawfully detained because the officers went beyond the scope of
a traffic stop. The defendant had been stopped because the trooper
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suspected he was driving under the influence of alcohol.

After

confirming that alcohol was not involved, the trooper continued to
hold the defendant's driver's license and vehicle registration.
Because the defendant appeared to be nervous the deputy asked if he
was

carrying

any

alcohol, firearms

or drugs.

The

responded, "No, if you'd like to check, go ahead."

defendant
The search

resulted in the discovery of four kilograms of cocaine.

Citing

Robinson this Court held, "The fact the defendants were nervous
does not raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity."

179

U.A.R. at 23.
Under similar circumstances as found in the instant case, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a District Court's ruling
suppressing evidence seized during a traffic stop.
v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991).2

United States

In Walker, the trooper

stopped the defendant on the interstate for speeding.

(Here there

was no violation alleged, just the wish to discuss a previous
incident.)

That trooper noticed that the defendant was nervous as

he handed the trooper the vehicle registration.

While the trooper

retained the license and registration, he questioned the defendant
about matters unrelated to the traffic stop.

The defendant was

asked if he was carrying any alcohol, drugs, or currency.

The

trooper had no reason to believe the defendant possessed any of
those items. The defendant denied possessing any alcohol or drugs.
He stated that he had about $1,600.00 in cash in response to the

x

The ruling of the district court in Walker was cited with
approval in State v. Robinson, supra.
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question about currency.

While continuing to hold the license and

registration, the trooper asked the defendant if he could search
the vehicle.

The defendant responded, "Sure, go ahead."

The

search resulted in the discovery of over 80 kilograms of cocaine.
The court held that in a traffic stop, the police may check a
driver's license, verify that the defendant had a right to possess
the vehicle and issue a citation. Even though the encounter lasted
only

about

ten

minutes,

the

court

in

questioning was an unlawful detention.
beyond the scope of a traffic stop.

Walker

held

that

the

The detention had gone

In order to so detain the

defendant, the officers needed an articulable

suspicion.

The

defendant's nervousness was an insufficient basis to establish a
belief that the defendant was engaged in the commission of a crime.
The court in Walker remanded the case to the District Court to make
a determination whether the consent was sufficiently attenuated
from the unlawful detention to make the evidence admissible.
In the instant case the deputy's questioning went beyond
checking

the driver's

citation.

The

encounter.
articulable

license

Appellant

Consequently,
or

reasonable

criminal activity.

and

was

registration

not

free

to

and

leave

issuing
during

a

the

Appellant

was

detained

without

an

suspicion

that

he was

involved

in

To determine if the evidence seized as a result

of that detention must be suppressed, the court must engage in a
two-part analysis:

First, the court must determine if there was a

voluntary consent to the search.
that

consent

is

Second, it must be determined if

sufficiently

18

attenuated

from

the

initial

illegality.

State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 685 (Utah, 1990).

Those

issues will be discussed in Points III, IV, V, infra.
POINT III
THE APPELLANT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT
TO THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE HE WAS DRIVING
The United States Supreme Court has given some general tests
to determine the voluntariness of a consent to search.

In Bumper

v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), the Court held that the
mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority to search does not
constitute a voluntary consent.

In that case, officers claimed to

have a valid warrant and the defendant's mother allowed them to
search his room.

That warrant was later found to be invalid.

Subsequently, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973), the court rejected the contention that before a consent may
be voluntary, the person giving the consent must know he has a
right to refuse to allow officers to search.

The Court went on to

hold that a consent must be freely and voluntarily given and not
the result of duress or coercion.

Voluntariness, it was held, is

a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.
The Court described some of the factors to be considered when
applying this totality of the circumstances test.

Those include:

the defendant's intelligence, whether or not the defendant was in
custody, the nature of the police questioning, the environment in
which the search took place, the defendant's knowledge of his right
to withhold consent and any other circumstances that weigh on the
issue of voluntariness.
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The issue of coercion as it relates to a consent to search has
been addressed by the Supreme Court in other contexts. The primary
issues raised in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980),
were

whether

airport

authorities

had

illegally

stopped

the

defendant and if she voluntarily consented to accompany agents to
an office.

The Court found that the authorities acted properly in

stopping and asking the defendant for identification.

The Court

went on to find that the defendant had consented to go to the Drug
Enforcement Administration office.

The officers had not kept the

defendant's airline ticket or identification. The Court found that
the defendant

could

reasonably

interpret

officers' actions

to

indicate that she did not have to accompany them.
Conversely, in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), it was
held that a stop of an individual on less than probable cause
cannot justify a detention in a small room by two police officers.
The

officers

had

identification.

retained

the defendant's

airline

ticket

and

They also had his luggage brought to the room

where he was being held.

The Court found that such a situation

would result in the defendant's belief that he was under arrest.
Because the defendant had not been informed that he was free to
board his plane and he actually believed he was being detained, it
was held that the encounter had lost its consensual nature.

The

Court went on to hold that, as a practical matter, Royer was under
arrest.

Since there was no probable cause to arrest, the search

was illegal. Thus, the evidence was ordered suppressed.

The Court

then made some observations about the nature of searches based on
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consent:
. . . where the validity of a search rests on
consentf the State has the burden of proving
that the necessary consent was obtained and
that it was freely and voluntarily given, a
burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere
submission to a claim of lawful authority.
460 U.S. at 497.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a similar
issue in United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985).
In that case, the defendant had been stopped for speeding in New
Mexico.

He produced a Virginia driver's license, and the car was

not registered to the defendant.

The officer ran a NCIC check to

determine if the vehicle had been reported stolen.
negative.
stating

The check was

He then requested assistance from a backup officer

that

he had

a

transporting narcotics.

"gut instinct" that the defendant

was

The officer returned to the defendant's

car and told Recalde he could either plead not guilty or sign the
ticket.

When it was signedf the officer asked the defendant to

step out of the car and requested to inspect the trunk. During the
inspection, the officer found that there had been tampering with
the screws in the molding.

The officer then requested that the

defendant accompany him to a nearby town.
do

so.

The defendant agreed to

At no time had the officer returned

the defendant's

driver's license, vehicle registration or provided the traffic
ticket.

At the police station the defendant consented to the

search of the car.

In analyzing the issue of whether the trip was

made with the defendant's consent, the Tenth Circuit employed a
three tier analysis that was later adopted by this Court in State
21

v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990).2

Accord.

State v.

Harmon, 215 U.A.R. 40 (Utah App. 1993).
In

determining

obtaining

if

there

has

been

duress

or

coercion

in

a consent to search, the Supreme Court of Utah has

described a number of factors that should be considered.

In State

v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the court stated:
Clearly the prosecution has the burden of
establishing
from
the
totality
of
the
circumstances that the consent was voluntary
given; however, the prosecution
is not
required to prove that defendant knew of his
right to refuse to consent in order to show
voluntariness. Factors which may show a lack
of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence
of a claim of authority to search by the
officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of
force by the officers; 3) a mere request to
search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the
vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or
trick on the part of the officer.
[Footnote
omitted.]
621 P.2d at 106.
In State v. Marshall, supra, the Court noted that the test for
voluntariness must be based on the totality of the circumstances of
the case.

To determine if a consent is voluntary, the Utah court

then adopted the Tenth Circuit's three part test:3
(1)
There must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal
and specific" and "freely and intelligently
given";
(2)
the government must prove consent was
given without duress or coercion, express or
implied; and

2

That analysis will be discussed, infra.

3

See:

United States v. Recalde, supra.
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(3)
the court indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and there must be
convincing evidence that such rights were
waived.
791 P.2d at 888.
With respect to the scope of a search made pursuant to a
consent, the court in Marshall, also relied on Tenth Circuit cases.
On that issue, the court stated:
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to
a search, the ensuing search must be limited
in scope to only the specific area agreed to
by defendant. "The scope of a consent search
is limited by the breadth of the actual
consent itself . . . Any police activity that
transcends the actual scope of the consent
given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment
rights of the suspect.
Id. at 888.
In this case, the consent to search was not unequivocal and
specific.

The Appellant initially agreed to allow the deputy to

look in the vehicle.

The deputy then directed that the search be

made of the trunk.

When the Appellant hesitated, the deputy

ordered him to open the trunk.
to hide.

He asked the Appellant what he had

The Appellant was put in a position of either admitting

there was contraband in the vehicle or stating that there was no
good reason why the trooper could not look in the trunk.

Such

negative pregnant questions should not be the basis for a voluntary
consent to search.

Consequently, the agreement to open the trunk

and the bags was not a specific and unequivocal consent to allow
the trooper to conduct the search.
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When analyzing the issue of duress or coercion, the factors
from Whittenback must be discussed.

First, the deputy's question

about what the Appellant had to hide is essentially a claim of
authority to search.

With respect to the second factor, there was

an implicit exhibition of force by Barney.
man, was

in uniform, armed

and

Appellant in an isolated area.

The deputy, a large

alone on the

interstate

with

The third factor under Whittenback

also weighs against the State.

Although the Appellant initially

offered to let the deputy look in the car, he never agreed to a
search of the car or the trunk or the suitcases inside the trunk.
The

fourth

factor, the cooperation

against the State.

of the owner, also weighs

The Defendant was the authorized driver and

only occupant of the vehicle.

The inescapable conclusion is that

any consent was given as a result of duress and coercion.
There

are

other

factors

described

in

Schneckloth

Bustamonte, supra, that are present in this case.

v.

The deputy had

continued to hold the sale of the vehicle papers and Appellant's
driver's license.

Appellant was not free to leave.

described, Appellant was unlawfully detained.
Appellant

in

a

line

of

questioning

that

interrogation unrelated to the traffic stop.

As previously

The deputy engaged
was

essentially

an

Finally, at no time

was Appellant told he did not have to let the deputy conduct the
search.
Under all of the tests previously described, this Court should
rule there was no voluntary consent to search.

Applying

the

presumption against waiver, the evidence is not convincing that
24

there was a voluntary consent to search.

The evidence was not

clear that the consent was unequivocal and specific.

The totality

of the circumstances indicate that the encounter in this case was
ripe with duress and coercion.
Appellant's
coupled

driver's

with

Furthermore, retaining of the

license and the vehicle

the

unlawful

detention

sales documents,

makes

this

case

indistinguishable from the situation in Royer and Recalde.

Since

the consent was involuntary, the evidence seized as a result of the
search

of

the

vehicle

and

luggage

located

in

the

trunk

is

inadmissible.
POINT IV
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRES BOTH A KNOWING
AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 14
RIGHTS BEFORE EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO
A CONSENT SEARCH IS ADMISSIBLE
At no time during the encounter with the trooper was Appellant
told that he did not have to allow a search of the vehicle.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution requires that the
State prove that Appellant was aware of his right to decline a
search

before

a consent

to

search may

make

evidence

from

a

warrantless search admissible.
This issue was previously raised in State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d
1268 (Utah App. 1990).

However, in Bobo this Court refused to

address the issue because of inadequate briefing.
the court

suggested

In a footnote,

a three part analysis to be employed

addressing novel state constitutional issues:

in

First, the unique

context of Utah's constitutional development should be discussed.
Second, it should be shown that the state appellate courts give
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different interpretations to their respective constitutions than is
given to the federal constitution.

Third, citation to authority

from other states supporting the particular construction that is
urged should be provided.
The issue raised here relates to a need for the State to
demonstrate that a person is aware that he need not submit to a
search before the state can claim that he consented to that search.
The general purpose of such a requirement is to protect citizens
from overreaching by law enforcement agents who may use very
subtle, yet coercive means to obtain a consent to search.

This

requirement is also based on the concept that there is a strong
presumption against waiver of important constitutional rights.
State v. Marshall, supra.4
Utah's constitution was adopted in 1896. One commentator has
stated:
The majority of present state constitutions
were drafted in the later half of the 19th
century, an era of popular mistrust and
hostility toward government.
The people's
mistrust of government is readily apparent on
the face of many state constitutions. Utah's
constitution,
drafted
in
1895,
is
representative of the era, particularly in
light of the fact that most sections of the
Utah constitution were copied from several
other state constitutions drafted in the later
part of the period.5

4

Cases involving Fourth Amendment analysis are cited for
illustrative purposes only and are specifically not intended to mix
state and federal constitutional analysis. Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1984).
5

Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government—The History of
Utah's Constitution, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311, at 314.
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That author also noted that the Utah Constitution grew out of a
history of religious and political persecution.

The early mormon

pioneers came to Utah to avoid religious persecutions in the midwest.

The primary source of the persecution was the practice of

polygamy.

That

practice

was

also

the

reason

for

rejection of the earlier applications for statehood.

political
Flynn also

noted that the practice of polygamy resulted in federal criminal
laws

that

resulted

in

the prosecution

forfeiture of their property.

of

Utah

residents

and

Such prosecutions would lead to

citizens desiring stronger constitutional privacy protections than
were afforded under the federal system.
The state constitutional provision against warrantless and
unreasonable searches and seizures is a specific limit on the
authority of the government to interfere with a citizen's privacy.
The Supreme Court has

stated

"[the Constitutional

requirement

relating to search and seizure] protects the 'security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police'".
v. Bustamonte, supra at 242.

Schneckloth

When considered in light of this

history it is unquestionable that the Utah State Constitution was
intended to limit the power of the government to a greater extent
than the same federal constitutional provisions.
With respect to search and seizure, the Utah appellate courts
have given a different interpretation to the Utah Constitution than
has been given to the federal constitution on the same issues.
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460

In

(Utah 1990), the Supreme Court

recognized that the Utah Constitution prohibited the opening of a
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vehicle door to inspect a vehicle identification number.

That was

a position that was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).

Likewise, in State v

Thompson, 810 P. 2d 415 (Utah 1991) the state supreme court required
a showing of probable cause to seize bank records.

In reaching

that conclusion, the court rejected the Supreme Court's ruling in
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).

Finally, in State v.

Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991), this Court held that the state
constitution requires specific statutory authorization to conduct
a roadblock.

This is a greater protection than has been provided

under the interpretations of the federal constitution.6
The

historical

context

of

the

adoption

of

the

Utah

Constitution indicates that it should provide greater protections
to its citizens than does the federal constitution.

The state

appellate courts have, in fact, provided greater protections to its
citizens in interpreting Article I, Section

14.

Although the

interpretation raised in this case has not been addressed by other
state

courts,

the

position

is

one

that

the

dissenters

in

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, felt should be applied to the
federal constitution.

Their reasoning should be adopted by this

Court.
As

previously

noted,

the

majority

of

the

justices

in

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, held that there is no knowledge

6

See: Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990).
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requirement for a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights

7

The Court

held that such knowledge is a factor to consider in determining if
there is a voluntary consent.

The reasoning employed by the court

to reach that conclusion is flawed.

The Court first relied on the

cases dealing with voluntary confessions.

Those cases did not

require that the person subjected to the questioning be aware he
had the right to refuse to answer the questions.8

That line of

authority resulted in the following test for voluntariness:

"Based

on the totality of the circumstances was the consent voluntary or
a product of a coercion of duress?

The reliance on this line of

cases is inappropriate to determine a consent to search issue. The
issue

in

those

cases

amounted to compulsion.

related

to whether

the

police

behavior

It makes no sense to require that a person

be aware that he is free from compulsion.
The second reason given in Schneckloth for not requiring a
knowing waiver was the problems the Court felt would be inherent in
proving knowledge.

However, if the police simply were to give a

suspect a warning that he need not consent to a searchf that should
suffice to prove knowledge. The Court rejected the contention that
such warnings be given for two reasons.

First, it would

be

impractical to formulate the warnings. Second, requests to consent
to a search would be impractical as it would interrupt the flow of
events and hinder police investigations.
7

The first contention is

See, Point II f supra.

8

Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Havnes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199
(1960) .
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Such warnings could be very specific and simple.9

simply wrong.

As for the second contention, that is really an argument that
favors requiring a warning.
unknowingly

waive

fundamental

People should not be required to
constitutional

rights

under

the

pressures inherent in a police encounter.
As

for

this

hinderance

to

police

investigation,

when

a

citizen's constitutional rights are weighed against the need to
investigate a crime, the constitutional rights are obviously more
important.

In his dissenting opinion in Schneckloth, Justice

Marshall addressed this issue of the practical need for police
investigation.

He stated:

I must conclude with some reluctance that when
the Court speaks of practicality, what it
really is talking of is the continued ability
of the police to capitalize on the ignorance
of citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge
what they could not achieve by relying only on
the knowing relinquishment of constitutional
rights. Of course it would be "practical" for
the police to ignore the commands of the
Fourth Amendment, if by practicality we mean
that more criminals will be apprehended, even
though the constitutional rights of innocent
people also go by the board.
But such a
practical advantage is achieved only at the
cost of permitting the police to disregard the
limitations that the Constitution places on
their behavior, a cost that a constitutional
democracy cannot long absorb.
412 U.S. at 288, Marshall J., dissenting.
The majority of the Court in Schneckloth also noted that a
requirement for knowledge of a right before a waiver has not been

9

An appropriate statement by the officer may be: "You have
the right to refuse to allow me to conduct a search. That refusal
cannot be used by law enforcement officers as a reason to search."
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required when that right is not involved in the guarantee for a
fair trial.

As part of this reasoning, majority also noted that

there is no requirement that courts indulge every
against a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.

presumption

However, this Court

has imposed that very requirement in determining if there has been
a waiver of Fourth Amendment rightsf State v. Marshall, supra.
Furthermore, by contending that knowing waivers apply only to trial
rights, the Court simply disregards the holding in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

In that case the Court required

officers

of

to

inform

a

suspect

his privilege

against

self-

incrimination and right to counsel before conducting a custodial
interrogation.

Giving a statement to authorities is not a trial

right such as the right to confrontation or the right to counsel at
trial.

Consequently,

the

court's

reliance

on

this

line

of

reasoning is inappropriate.
Finally, the Court in Schneckloth distinguishes the Miranda
requirements because the situation in Schneckloth did not involve
inherently

coercive

tactics.

The Court

further

reasoned

the

situation where a consent to search is obtained does not generally
involve a defendant being in custody. As previously described, the
instant

case

Furthermore,

did
a

involve

consent

to

some

inherently

search

is

coercive

often

given

tactics.10
after

a

questionable or illegal detention11 as was the situation in this
10

See:

Point II, supra.

n

See: State v. Sierra, 784 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988); State
v. Arroyo, supra; State v. Sims, supra; State v* Robinson, supra;
State v. Godina-Luna, supra.
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case.

Oftentimes, a consent to search is given under circumstances

that are equally or more coercive than the custodial interrogation
that the Miranda court sought to control.
The reasoning
obviously

flawed.

supporting the conclusion in Schneckloth is
The dissenters all would have held that a

fundamental constitutional right cannot be waived without one being
aware of its existence.

Justice Marshall summarized the need for

this knowledge requirement and criticized the majority

opinion

stating:
The holding today confines the protection of
the
Fourth
Amendment
against
searches
conducted without probable cause to the
sophisticated, the knowledgeable, and I might
add, the few.
[footnote omitted]
In the
final analysis, the Court now sanctions a game
of blindman's bluff, in which the police
always have the upper hand, for the sake of
nothing more than the convenience of the
police.
But the guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment were never intended to shrink before
such an ephemeral and changeable interest.
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment struck the
balance against this sort of convenience and
in favor of certain basic civil rights.
412 U.S. at 289-290, Marshall J. dissenting.
This Court should conclude that before one waives

rights

described in Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution that
person should be aware of those rights.

Furthermore, this Court

should adopt the "primacy model"12 of state constitutional analysis
and address this issue even if the court finds there was a Fourth
Amendment violation. The court did effectively adopt this model of

12

See:
Note, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah
Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319.
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State

interpretation in State v. Sims, supra*

In that case, the court

found both Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 violations.
In both Larocco and Sims, it was held that the exclusionary
rule applies to violations of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

Since any consent given in this case was neither

knowing nor voluntary, the evidence seized as a result of the
search is inadmissible and should be suppressed.
POINT V
ANY CONSENT GIVEN TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE LACKED
ATTENUATION FROM THE INITIAL ILLEGAL STOP,
MAKING THE EVIDENCE SEIZED INADMISSIBLE.
For evidence to be admissible as a result of a consent to
search,

that

consent

must

be both

voluntary

and

it must

be

attenuated from any prior illegal stop or search. State v. Arroyo,
supra.

See also State v. Thurman, supra.

If this case fails the

Arroyo attenuation analysis, the consent becomes the fruit of the
illegal stop.

However, if the court finds that the consent is

involuntary,13 this attenuation analysis need not be reached.
To determine if a voluntary consent is sufficiently attenuated
from a prior illegal stop or search, an analysis of three factors
is required.

Those factors were initially described in Brown v.

Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).

The factors include:

the temporal

proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of consent,
the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and the
purpose and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct.

The Utah

Supreme Court in State v. Arroyo, supra said that the courts should
13

See:

Points II and III, supra.
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consider "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct",
the "temporal proximity" of the illegality and the consent and "the
presence of intervening circumstances".

796 2d 691 N.Y. (citing

Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04). In State v. Thurman, supra the Supreme
Court elaborated on the factors set forth in Arroyo.

The court

quoted Justice Powell in Brown;
The "purpose and flagrancy" factor directly
relates to the deterrent value of suppression.
(Citation omitted.)
* * * * *

The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
necessarily assumes that the police have
engaged in willful, or at the very least
negligent, conduct which has deprived the
defendant of some right. (Citation omitted.)
Id. 1263.
The court then ruled:
In sum to find a defendant's consent following
police illegality is valid under the Fourth
Amendment, the prosecutor must prove (i) that
the defendant's consent was given voluntarily,
i.e., that the consent was the product of his
or her own free will; and (ii) that the
consent was not obtained by exploitation of
the
prior
illegality,
i.e.,
that
the
connection between the consent and the prior
illegality was sufficiently attenuated that
excluding the evidence would have no deterrent
effect.
See Arroyo 796 P.2d at 688. Id.
1265.
Evidence obtained in searches following police illegality must meet
both tests to be admissible.
This court has analyzed these factors and found as a matter of
law that the consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the
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initial illegal detention in a number of cases.14
The only case where this Court held that the consent was not
tainted by the prior illegal stop is State v. Castner, 825 P.2d
699, (Utah App. 1992).

In that case, the officer had stopped the

defendant for a traffic violation.

After returning the driver's

license, registration and traffic ticket, the officer allowed the
defendant to leave.

The defendant did not do so, but stayed and

asked the officer questions.

As a result of that questioning, a

consent to search the vehicle was obtained.
clearly distinguishable from Castner.

The instant case is

The Appellant in this case

was never free to leave after the initial stop.
The facts in this case are closely analogous to Robinson,
Sims, and Park.

In those cases, the court held that the consent

and illegal stop were closely related in time.

There was a very

short period of time between the initial unlawful detention in this
case and the search of the vehicle.

The video tape shows that the

entire encounter lasted less than five minutes.

Therefore, the

first factor in Arroyo must be weighed against the State.
The

second

circumstances.

factor

involves

an

analysis

of

intervening

The instant case is again analogous to Robinson,

Sims and Park where no such circumstances were found.

The only

case where this Court has found intervening circumstances was
Castner

which

has

previously

been

discussed.

Intervening

circumstances in other jurisdictions have been found to include a
14

State v. Sims, supra; State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App.
1991); State v. Carter, 808 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1991); State v.
Robinson, supra: State v. Godina-Luna, supra.
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release

from

custody,

an

appearance

before

the

magistrate,

discussions with a lawyer, or a conviction on an unrelated charge,
United States v. Delqadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d
1988).

Other

intervening

circumstances

that

1292

(9th Cir.

may

establish

sufficient attenuation have been described in the case law include:
giving of the Miranda warning and allowing the defendant to consult
with a passenger, United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.
1983); Juarez v. State, 708 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988);
telling the defendant that he did not have to consent to the
search, Reyes v. State, 741 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987);
developing probable cause from independent sources to justify the
detention, United States v. Cherry: 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986);
and whether the consent was volunteered or requested, People v.
Borges, 69 N.Y.2d

1031, 511 N.E.2d

58

(1987).

None of those

circumstances or analogous circumstances were present in this case.
Consequently, this factor also weighs against the State.
The final factor to be analyzed is the purpose and flagrancy
of the detention.

In Sims the court indicated that if the purposes

of the roadblock were good then the unlawful detention may be
overlooked.15
multiple

The

court

Sims

found

that

a roadblock

purposes did not outweigh the other

attenuation analysis.
instant

in

case could

factors

for

in this

Likewise, the purpose of the stop in the

not outweigh

15

the effect

of the

first

two

A more logical reading of this factor is that if the initial
illegality was for a particularly bad purpose or was a flagrant
violation, then the evidence may be ordered to be suppressed in
spite of a favorable analysis on the other two factors for the
State.

36

factors.
If

this

Court

finds

that

voluntary, that voluntariness
detention.

the

consent

in

this

case

is tainted by the prior

was

illegal

The detention and any consent were closely related in

time and there were no intervening circumstances.

Consequently,

the evidence seized as a result of the search is inadmissible.
CONCLUSION
Appellant was illegally stopped, detained unlawfully and any
consent obtained as a result of that detention was both involuntary
and tainted by the earlier detention. This case should be remanded
to the District Court with an order that a new trial be granted, at
which the evidence seized during the search of Appellant's vehicle
will not be admitted.
DATED this

"£/>

day of August, 1993.

_J5j
D. GILBERT ATHAY
Lawyer for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

^3

day of August, 1993, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage prepaid
fully thereon, to Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General, 236 State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.

-Ml
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R. Don Brown #0464
Sevier County Attorney
Sevier County Courthouse
250 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (801) 896-6812
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
GREGORY MORRIS MATISON, aka
GERALD MORRIS, aka MORRIS
GREGORY MATISON,
DOB:
Defendant.

Case No. 921600010FS
Judge Don V. Tibbs

This matter came before the Court on July 14, 1992, on Defendant's
Motion to Suppress.

The Motion was argued by counsel for Defendant, Gil

Athay, and R. Don Brown for the State.
hearing memoranda.

The parties have also submitted post-

Having duly considered the evidence and arguments or the

parties, including recent federal and Utah decisional law, the Court now makes
and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On January 14, 1992, Deputy Phil Barney was traveling to the

Salina interchange of 1-70 when he observed a vehicle which had just come off
the eastbound lanes of 1-70 at such exit.
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2.

Deputy Barney observed the vehicle "fish tail" as it came onto

the access road from the freeway and then the vehicle stopped at a gas
station/convenience store.
3.

Deputy Barney drove up to the freeway underpass where the

vehicle had been out of control to determine whether the action was the result
of icy conditions and observed that the road was dry.
4.

The officer observed that the driver of the vehicle was still

stopped at the business establishment and commenced traffic enforcement
activities on 1-70 east of Salina.
5.

Upon subsequently observing the vehicle traveling eastbound out

of Salina and knowing that there are no services for 110 miles in such
direction, Deputy Barney decided to stop the vehicle to determine whether the
driver was impaired or why the driver was unable to control the vehicle at the
Salina interchange.
6.

The officer stopped the vehicle at 1:33 p.m. as shown on the

video tape recording of the scene of the stop.
7.

When the officer approached the Defendant's vehicle, the

Defendant asked, "What am I being stopped for?
8.

Am I speeding?"

Deputy Barney responded by indicating that he would explain in a

moment and asked for the license and registration to the vehicle.
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9.

At 1:34:14 p.m., Deputy Barney explained the reason for the stop

and the Defendant stated that he had been having trouble with his cruise
control and that was why he was unable to control the vehicle.
10.

Deputy Barney had at this point smelled the odor of fresh

ground coffee, an ingredient commonly used to mask the odor of raw marijuana,
and noted the extreme nervousness of the Defendant who had offered an
unreasonable explanation of his traveling in a vehicle for which he was not
the owner.
11.

Deputy Barney asked if the vehicle contained firearms or drugs

and after receiving a negative response asked, "May I look in the vehicle?"
12.

The Defendant consented at 1:34:35 p.m.

13.

At 1:35:50 p.m., Deputy Barney asked the Defendant, "Would you

pop the trunk," and the Defendant opened the trunk.
14.

Upon observing the suitcases in the trunk and smelling the

suitcase, Deputy Barney handcuffed the Defendant and arrested him at 1:36:38
p.m.
15.

At 1:38:02, Deputy Barney opened one of the cases sufficiently

to observe marijuana.
16.

The vehicle was found to contain 138.25 pounds of marijuana.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Defendant submitted no evidence or testimony regarding his

claim of interest in the substance seized or the contents of the vehicle and
he lacks standing to challenge the search.
2.

The initial traffic stop of the vehicle was pursuant to a

legitimate law enforcement function.
3.

The Defendant, upon being asked about the presence of firearms

or drugs, voluntarily consented to open the vehicle for inspection.
4.

The officer used no threats or coercion and the Defendant's

actions were voluntary.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied.
SIGNED BY MY HAND this

/ f

day of K\$\r\t,

1992.

ir
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was placed in the United
States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully
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thereon fully prepaid on the

j4~

day of September, 1992, addressed as

followsJ
Mr. D. Gilbert Athay
Attorney at Law
72 East Fourth South, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mr. R. Don Brown
Sevier County Attorney
250 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701

+A\C\a U&n, S M T / M

Paul D. Lyman #4522
Deputy Sevier County Attorney
Sevier County Courthouse
250 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (801) 896-6812
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GREGORY MORRIS MATISON, aka
GERALD MORRIS, aka MORRIS
GREGORY MATISON,
DOB:
Defendant.

:
:

JUDGMENT

:
:

Case No. 921600010FS
Judge Don V. Tibbs

:

The above-captioned matter having come on for Sentencing on the 19th
day of January, 1993, pursuant to a previous finding of guilty to the offense
of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony, and the Court
having entertained the arguments of Paul D. Lyman for the State of Utah, and
of Gilbert Athay, Attorney for the Defendant, and being apprised of no further
impediment to entry of Judgment;
NOW THEREFORE, the Defendant's offense is reduced from a Second
Degree Felony to a Third Degree Felony and the Defendant is sentenced to serve
a term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison, and fined in the
amount of $5,000.00, plus the 85% surcharge; provided that execution of the
prison sentence shall be stayed and all but $1,250.00, plus the 85% surcharge,
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of the fine are suspended; however, the Defendant shall serve one year in the
Sevier County Jail, with a review of this matter in 90 days from the date the
jail sentence begins tc be served.

The Defendant's request for a stay of

imposition of sentence pending appeal is granted providing that the appeal be
filed within 10 days.

MAILING €fifi^H^E€ftTir^-^

\ .

I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing JUDGMENT was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah,
with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the <3*7 - day of January,
1993, addressed as follows:
\ Mr. D. Gilbert Athay
Attorney at Law
72 East Fourth South, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Sevier County Jail
Sevier County Courthouse
250 North M a m Street
Richfield, Utah 84701

